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Summary 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the 
competitiveness of contract bids entered by individual 
contractors and the size (value) and type of the contracts 
involved.  The development of a competitive index is described 
which, when combined with a quadratic form of curvilinear 
regression analysis, provides results similar to previous work 
in the field. 
 
 
 
Sommaire 
 
Cet expose examine les relations entre la concurrence des 
offres de contrats faits par des entrepreneurs de construction 
et la valeur et le genre de ces contrats.  On presente 
l'evolution d'une indice concurrentielle.  Lorsqu'on l'utilise 
avec regression, elle donne des resultats comparables aux 
etudes anterieures dans le domaine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Predictive information concerning the competitiveness of 
contractors is a potentially valuable asset to many decision 
makers involved in the construction procurement process.  The 
selective tender mechanism for instance has been shown to rely 
quite heavily on the quality of prequalification decisions (1), 
in the compilation of periodic or ad hoc lists of contractors 
for certain types or size ranges of contracts.  (NB the terms 
'contract' and 'size' are treated as being synonymous with 
'project' and 'value' in this paper).  Similarly, a 
contractor's contract selection decision may be strongly 
influenced by his own likely competitiveness relative to, and 
together with, that of his competitors. 
 
One approach to acquiring competitiveness information is by 
monitoring past bidding behaviour.  At present this seems to be 
done rather subjectively and, as Flanagan and Norman (2) point 
out, "...in today's highly competitive market there is a need 
for more structured monitoring". 
 
The lack of any widely used formal or structured methods may be 
due to the level of inherent uncertainties involved.  At face 
value, competitive tendering appears to be a valid means of 
attracting a realistic economic price for a contract - the most 
efficiently organised contractor producing the lowest cost 
estimate and thence the lowest bid.  The uncertainty 
surrounding the bid calculation however, particularly in cost 
estimation, tends to introduce a large element of chance into 
the process.  The resulting 'noise' makes the task of 
identifying competitive (efficient) contractors a difficult 
one. 
 
Despite these difficulties, some general results are available. 
 Using a mixture of statistical techniques and visual 
observation, Flanagan and Norman were able to examine the 
tender performance of a small, medium and large contractor 
finding that (i) the small contractor's competitiveness was 
related to both contract type and size; (ii) the large 
contractor was more competitive when bidding for large 
contracts; and (iii) the medium contractor's competitiveness 
was not related to either type or size.   
 
Flanagan and Norman's findings also indicate a positive 
correlation between the between size of contractor and size of 
contract.  Economic scale theory suggests that larger size 
contractors undertake larger contracts with increased rates of 
efficiency.  Economic value will therefore depend on matching 
the size of contractor to the size of contract.  Thus, if the 
proposed contract size is within a contractor's preferred range 
then it is likely that the contractor will construct the work 
more efficiently and bid more competitively. 
 
The main purpose of the work described in this paper was to 
examine more closely Flanagan and Norman's approach to this 
type of bid analysis, propose refinements, and test the 
validity of their findings with new data.  The result is a new 
line of analysis using curvilinear regression.  In applying 
this to some fresh data however produces results quite similar 
to those of Flanagan and Norman. 
 
COMPETITIVE MEASURES AND INFLUENCES 
 
Bidding performance 
Bidding performance analysis is concerned with relationships 
between bids entered by different contractors in competition.  
As bidding performance is the product of competitive tendering 
for different size contracts a suitable measure is needed to 
reflect the competitiveness of bids for all contracts.  The 
measure adopted here is one commonly found in the literature - 
the percentage of each bid above the lowest bid recorded for 
each contract, ie. 
 
                        bidder's bid - lowest bid 
     Competitiveness =  ───────────────────────── x 100%        
    .... (1) 
                             lowest bid 
 
Lower percentage values indicate greater competitiveness and 
vice versa. 
 
The influence of contract size 
Relationships between the competitiveness and contract size can 
be observed by plotting the value of bids entered in past 
auctions against the competitive percentage.  Curvilinear 
regression analysis can be used to determine the line of best 
fit (eg. Figure 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Competitiveness and contract size 
 
Assuming the regression line represents a bidder's true 
competitiveness/contract size relationship, then he is clearly 
most competitive where the regression line is closest to the X 
axis, ie. at the trough of the regression line.  The 
corresponding contract value at this point represents the 
bidder's preferred contract size.  Small contractors are 
expected to have smaller preferred contract sizes than large 
contractors. 
 
A shallow regression line indicates a wide preferred size 
range.  Conversely a steep regression line indicates a narrow 
preferred size range.  Small contractors are expected to have a 
narrower preferred size range than large contractors due to 
obvious resource constraints.  Thus it is anticipated that the 
regression curves of increasing size contractors will be 
shallower and shift to the right as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Preferred contract size and size of contractor 
 
The notion that contractors have preferred size ranges implies 
that the shape of the regression line will be concave for, no 
matter how small or large the contractor is in size, in terms 
of contract size there will be upper and lower limits on 
contractors' competitiveness.  At these limits a contractor's 
competitors should become relatively more competitive thereby 
increasing the slope of the regression line, suggesting the 
quadratic functions shown. 
 
Although it is expected that the shape of the regression line 
will be concave, this may not always be the case and a convex 
curve may be due to the existence any one or a combination of 
the following: 
 
(1)two or more preferred size ranges 
(2)weak or no preferred size range 
(3)confounding effects of other preferences, eg.location 
(4)'noise' effects caused by random fluctuations in bidding 
(5)sampling effects, eg. lack of data, spurious data, and 
outliers. 
 
One way of assessing the extent to which a contract size 
equates to the preferred size range is to measure the slope of 
the regression line at a given value.  The shallower the slope, 
the closer the value is to the contractor's absolute preferred 
size (ie. the point where the regression line produces a 
horizontal tangent).  The steeper the slope the further away 
the value is from the contractor's preferred size. 
 
It also follows that the steeper the regression line the 
greater is the influence of contract size on bidding 
performance as the preferred size range will be smaller (Figure 
3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Degree of influence of contract size  
 
The concave slope of the regression line is expressed by the 
equation:- 
 
Y  =  ax2 - bx + c                                   ..... (2) 
 
By differentiating the equation the slope of the line can be  
determined.  Therefore the  differential 
 
2ax - b                                              ..... (3) 
 
indicates a slope of 2a. 
 
The influence of contract size on bidding performance can be 
measured by considering the coefficient for the x squared term. 
 The larger the coefficient the steeper is the slope of the 
regression line and thus the greater the correlation between 
contract size and competitiveness. 
 
In respect of size of contractor, due to the influence of 
resource constraints, smaller contractors should have smaller 
preferred size ranges than large contractors and therefore 
larger coefficients for the x squared term. 
 
The influence of contract type 
Contractors may also have preferred contract types for which 
they tender more competitively.  Flanagan and Norman's small 
contractor, for example, was successful in 9 out of 12 bidding 
attempts for county council primary schools.  Their interviews 
with this contractor suggested that his greater competitiveness 
was because  "...he was aware of the problems inherent in 
building county council primary schools". 
 
It would seem therefore that experience is a key factor.  By 
using feedback from previous similar types of contract handled 
by the contractor, the contractor can be more confident of his 
actual cost and therefore be in a position to bid more 
competitively. 
 
The influence of a particular contract type can be assessed by 
grouping  competitiveness percentages into contract types for 
comparison with the overall competitive percentage's for all 
contract types.  Thus if a contractor's average competitiveness 
percentage for a particular type is less than his average 
competitiveness percentage for all contract types, he is taken 
to be competitive for that contract type and vice versa. 
 
A measure of a contractor's relative contract type 
competitiveness is the ratio of his average contract type 
competitiveness percentage to his overall average 
competitiveness percentage, values greater and less than unity 
indicating contract type uncompetitiveness and competitiveness 
respectively.  The further the ratio is from unity the stronger 
is the degree of (un)competitiveness.  Naturally a value of 
exactly unity indicates neutral competitiveness for the 
contract type. 
 
The standard deviation of these ratios provides a measure of 
competitiveness variability for building types.  Smaller 
contractors, are likely to display a greater competitiveness 
variability than larger contractors due to a combination of 
reasons which include resource constraints coupled with the 
fact that there will be a greater variety of potential 
competitors.  The effect of this is a tendency for smaller size 
contractors to specialise when tendering competitively. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
A total of 155 bids from 58 contractors were analysed for a 
series of Hong Kong public sector contracts between 1982 and 
1988.  The contracts were classified into types according to 
the CI/Sfb building type classification (3) and values updated 
to a common base date (August 1988) based on the tender price 
index published by the Architectural Services Department, Hong 
Kong Government.  The average updated value of contracts in the 
sample varied between HK$1.78 million to $54.57 million with an 
average value of HK$12.8 million.  The open tendering system 
practised by the Hong Kong Government produced an average of 17 
bidders for each contract. 
 
 Table 1: Bidding performance by contract type 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------ 
Bidder   Competitiveness    Tender      No of      No of      
Av     Av no 
code       percentage      variance   attempts   successes   
rank   bidders 
--------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
 
All building types 
 
 18          19.04          571.84        36         3        
8       15 
 45          34.11          199.54        27         0       
15       19 
 52          14.49         1064.82        28         6        
6       18 
127          13.47          109.90        35         0        
9       18 
142          20.56          110.95        29         0       
12       17 
 
Fire stations 
 
 18          16.43          199.81        11         2        
7       13 
 45          34.33          123.53        11         0       
16       18 
 52          12.17           37.67         8         0        
8       20 
127          13.24          118.55        12         0        
8       18 
142          22.68           75.73        11         0       
12       16 
 
Police stations 
 
 18          30.44         1770.19         9         1        
6       13 
 45          27.19          620.05         5         0        
7       18 
 52          58.02         6254.10         4         0       
10       14 
127          26.71           77.00         2         0        
8       14 
142          17.85            7.72         4         0       
11       13 
 
Primary schools 
 
 18          14.94          138.40        13         0        
9       17 
 45          35.55           86.16         7         0       
17       18 
 52           2.69           18.90        11         6        
3       17 
127           8.12           35.24        14         0        
7       17 
142          16.02           64.38         9         0       
12       18 
 
Secondary schools 
 
 18          12.11          294.30         3         0        
8       17 
 45          41.41          167.60         4         0       
20       22 
 52           9.31           61.81         5         0        
9       23 
127          20.75          129.35         7         0       
15       21 
142          26.22          346.64         5         0       
13       22 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------- 
 
Each bidder was assigned a code to preserve identity and 
classified into size groupings according to Government criteria 
for contractor classification (4,5), ie. up to HK$3 million 
(small), up to HK$15 million (medium), unlimited (large).  
 
Bidders coded 5, 52, 127 (medium size) and 18, 142 (large size) 
were selected for analysis as they appeared the most frequently  
in the data collected.  Insufficient data were available to 
allow the inclusion of small contractors in the analysis. 
 
Table 1 summarises the bidding performance of the five  
contractors analysed.  In addition to the competitiveness 
percentage and variance, the number of attempts and successes, 
average rank and average number of bidders are also shown to 
provide a complete picture of the results. 
 
It could be argued that a success for a contract type indicates 
that the contractor is likely to be more confident in bidding 
and should, due to the learning curve, be in a position to 
undertake the work more efficiently.  The average rank and 
average number of bidders gives a general indication of the 
position of the contractor in the tender distribution. 
 
Out of 155 bidding attempts there were 9 successes, ie. 1 in 
17.22, a reasonable rate with an average of 17 competing 
bidders for each contract.  It is surprising however to find 
all the successes coming from only two of the five contractors 
analysed. 
 
Bidder 52, with respect to primary school contracts, had 6 
successes from 11 attempts indicating a strong competitive 
preference for this type of building.  This result is similar 
to Flanagan and Norman's small contractor in the UK who was 
successful in 9 out of 12 attempts for county council primary 
school contracts.  This proclivity to primary schools may be 
due to the fact that Government primary schools are very 
similar or identical in design.  Another possibility is that, 
in order to compete successfully, smaller contractors have to 
specialise in the work they undertake. 
 
Bidder 18 was the other low bidder contained in this sample.  
His success rate may be due to a rather high bidding 
variability relative to other contractors.  (It should be noted 
that bidder 52's comparatively high bidding variability for all 
building types seems to be attributable to a strong preference 
for primary schools coupled with the fact that his four bidding 
attempts for police stations varied between 7.91% and 175.55% 
above the lowest tender.  If this latter percentage is 
disregarded this would produce for police stations a variance 
of 172.28 and reduce the competitiveness percentage to 18.84%). 
 
Generally, bidder 52 is the most competitive contractor.  
Bidder 45 on the other hand is generally the least competitive 
contractor.  In comparison with the other contractors in the 
sample, bidder 127's performance is reasonable in terms of 
competitiveness and variability.  The lack of any success from 
a total of 35 bidding attempts is unfortunate as bids within 5% 
of the lowest tender were entered on nine occasions, once 
ranking third when only 0.37% above the lowest tender! 
 
Bidder 127's bidding performance on each building type can be 
seen clearly with the aid of regression analysis (Figure 4).  
This shows the quadratic regression curve fitted to the data 
for each of the four building types.  Bold lines indicate the 
fit within the recorded data values and dashed lines show the 
curve extrapolated outside the data values.  Three of the 
curves are significant at the five percent level as adjudged by 
the F test, and two clearly follow the expected concave 
quadratic shape.  As can be seen, the preferred size of fire 
stations and primary schools is around HK$5 million and HK$14 
million respectively, the results being inconclusive for the 
remaining two types.  It can also be seen that relative range 
and degree of competitiveness of this contractor over both fire 
stations and primary schools is identical, both curves having 
the same shape and distance from the X axis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4: Contractor 127's bidding performance 
 
It is possible that the contract sizes in the sample were more 
in the preferred size range of the medium size contractors 
(bidders 45, 52 and 127) than of larger size contractors, as 
the average value of contracts was $12.80 million.  If this is 
true, medium size contractors would be expected to perform 
better and be more competitive.  With the exception of bidder 
45, who is competitively very weak, this appears to be 
generally the case with these data. 
 
The possibility that a preferred size range is more relevant to 
medium size contractors was examined by further regression 
analysis.  Taking the data for each of the five contractors, 
irrespective of contract type, produces the regression curves 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
For the medium size contractors, bidders 52 and 127, it may be 
seen that their preferred size range is between HK$5-20 
million.  Outside of these ranges it would appear that they are 
not so competitive, which would be expected for medium size 
contractors.  Bidder 45 displays the same characteristics but 
to a lesser degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 5: Bidding performance of five contractors 
 
Turning to the large size contractors, generally it would 
appear from bidder 18's regression curve that he has a 
preference for large size contracts, supporting Flanagan and 
Norman's assertion that large contractors "appear to bid more 
competitively on large projects". 
 
In respect of contract size, Table 2 gives the coefficients for 
the x squared term obtained by using regression analysis in 
descending order of influence. 
 
 Table 2: Regression coefficients 
 
                   -------------------------------------- 
                   Bidder code     size       coefficient 
                                                (x106) 
                   -------------------------------------- 
                        52        medium         -11.63 
                        18        large           -3.30 
                       142        large            3.20 
                       127        medium          -2.94 
                        45        medium          -1.42 
                   -------------------------------------- 
 
Thus bidders 52 is the most and 45 the least influenced by 
contract size.  It is interesting to see that, contrary to 
expectations, the degree of influence is not significantly 
correlated with any particular size of contractor.  The reason 
may be that, as the data are restricted to four building types 
with an average value of HK$12.8 million, the coefficients 
obtained for the large contractors relate to only a part of 
their overall regression curve. 
 
Table 3 shows the influence of contract type on bidding 
performance. 
 
 Table 3:  Contract type effect s 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
BIDDER           18          45          52         127       
  142 
--------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
AVERAGE 
COMPETITIVENESS 
PERCENTAGE      19.0        34.1        14.5        13.5      
  20.6 
--------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
 
Fire station    16.4        34.3        12.2        13.2      
  22.7 
                ----=0.86   ----=1.01   ----=0.83   ----=0.98 
  ----=1.10                    19.0        34.1        14.5   
     13.5        20.6 
 
Police          30.4        27.2        58.0        26.7      
  17.9 
station         ----=1.60   ----=0.80   ----=4.00   ----=1.98 
  ----=0.87 
                19.0        34.1        14.5        13.5      
  20.6 
 
Primary         15.0        35.6         2.7         8.1      
  16.0 
school          ----=0.79   ----=1.04   ----=0.18   ----=0.60 
  ----=0.78 
                19.0        34.1        14.5        13.5      
  20.6 
 
Secondary       35.6        41.4         9.3        20.8      
  26.2 
school          ----=1.87   ----=1.21   ----=0.64   ----=1.54 
  ----=1.28 
                19.0        34.1        14.5        13.5      
  20.6 
--------------------------------------------------------------
------------- 
 
 
Values greater and less than unity indicate uncompetitiveness 
and competitiveness respectively which suggests that these 
contractors are (with the exception of number 45) competitive 
in primary school auctions and (with the exception of number 
52) uncompetitive in secondary school auctions. 
 
Standard deviations of 1.75, 0.61, 0.54, 0.23, and 0.17 were 
recorded for bidders 52 (medium size), 127 (medium size), 18 
(large size), 142 (large size), and 45 (medium size) 
respectively which offers little evidence of the postulated 
relationship between competitiveness variablity and contractor 
size. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
A method has been proposed for quantifying the degree of 
competitiveness of individual construction contract bidders and 
this has been applied in an analysis of some 'live' building 
contract data in Hong Kong. 
 
Our results confirm Flanagan and Norman's contention that 
'tendering strategy in general is affected by the type of 
project and value range', specifically that 
 
(1)competitiveness of individual bidders is influenced to  
varying degrees by contract type and size, and 
 
(2)large contractors seem to be more competitive on large  
contracts. 
 
As a corollary to (2) we also show that small and medium size 
contractors are more competitive on small and medium size 
contracts respectively. 
 
There is no evidence however that larger contractors are more 
competitive over a wider range of contract sizes than smaller 
contractors or that smallwer contractors are more variable in 
their competitiveness between contract types, although this may 
be more a function of the sample analysed than a characteristic 
of the population.  Further work is currently underway to check 
out this result through the collection of more data and the 
development of some suitable tests of significance. 
 
Our analysis further indicates that successful methods of 
securing contracts may be through 
 
(1)bidding very competitively for a particular contract type 
(ie. adopting a building type strategy) as was displayed by 
bidder 52 who was the lowest bidder for primary schools on 
six out of eleven bidding attempts. 
 
(2)having a comparatively high tender variability as was 
displayed by bidder 127 who was the lowest bidder on three 
occasions. 
 
The analyses described in this paper may be used by designers 
to refine pre tender estimates and pre qualify contractors on 
tender lists; and by contractors to define the market sector in 
which they are most competitive as an aid to contract selection 
and bidding. 
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